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Abstract 
 
Researchers in the past have found that 
personal experience and formal training lead 
to better accuracy when predicting research 
outcomes in areas of psychology. Personal 
experience and formal training were 
compared in this study on the ability of 
students to predict research outcomes in 
social psychology. Students completed 
questionnaires that measured their social 
engagement (a proxy to personal experience), 
their academic history and status, and their 
knowledge of social psychological findings. 
Students with more psychology classes taken 
in college were better able to predict research 
outcomes (r = .24). Psychology majors knew 
more findings in social psychology than non-
psychology majors (d = .28). Students with 
higher academic status were better able to 
correctly identify research findings (η=.31). 
Measures of personal experience (i.e., social 
engagement) did not predict accuracy in 
identifying correct research findings. Formal 
training was a better predictor of accuracy 
than personal experience. Students had the 
opportunity to change their misconceptions 
about the social world when they were taught 
research findings in the classroom. People 
might also learn about human social behavior 
vicariously or from small amounts of social 
interaction rather than from high amounts of 
social engagement. 
 
Everyday, people are faced with 
making decisions in social situations. The 
social situations that require decisions are 
often unclear, there may be multiple options 
to choose from, and it may be difficult to 
determine the best choice. Many researchers 
believe that the average person can make 
accurate decisions and accurate predictions 
within these social situations based on an 
understanding created from their experiences 
of everyday events (Anderson & Lindsay, 
1998; Wegener & Petty, 1998). This 
understanding is called lay knowledge. Lay 
knowledge is the social knowledge gained 
from experiential learning during typical life 
events (Kruglanski, 1989). Many of these life 
events involve information about other people 
within a social context. People use this lay 
knowledge to create naïve theories.  
Naïve theories are “knowledge 
structures with a causal or explanatory 
component” (Anderson & Lindsay, 1998, 
p.8). People use naïve theories to make 
predictions and to explain events. A woman, 
for example, may have been physically 
abused by a large man. She might also have 
known other women who have been abused 
by large men. She might begin to think that 
large men are abusive. This naïve theory 
might lead the woman to stay away from 
large men in order to avoid physical abuse. In 
this case the naïve theory was an adaptive 
strategy to keep the woman out of harm. 
 According to Anderson and Lindsay 
(1998), the causal links provided by naïve 
theories simplify social perception allowing 
for high levels of inferential accuracy. This 
simplification occurs because as people 
gather information, the new information is 
linked to existing knowledge stored in the 
brain. These links become organized, 
meaningful networks of information called 
schemas. People are able to later recall and 
use this information to predict and explain 
events (Bartlett, 1932).  
According to Bartlett (1932), people 
compare new incoming information with 
existing schemas to create meaning. In his 
study, Bartlett had participants read unusual 
stories that contained information that was 
unfamiliar to most people. He found that 
when asked to recall the information from the 
story, participants recalled a changed and 
distorted version. The participants had 
attempted to link and use information that 
they already knew to create meaning in the 
story, even though the information was not 
part of the story given to them. 
An important component for 
determining accuracy, then, is knowledge and 
expertise. In a study by Chase and Simon 
(1973), novice and expert chess players were 
shown an incomplete chess game and then 
asked to recall the position of chess pieces. 
The experts, having an understanding of the 
rules and plays of the game, were able to 
recall the location of significantly more chess 
pieces than the novices. The experts were not, 
however, able to recall as many chess pieces 
when the pieces were placed randomly on the 
board. When the chess pieces were placed on 
the board according to the rules of the game, 
they were easier to remember because they 
provided more meaning to the expert chess 
player. When placed haphazardly, the pieces 
provided little meaning to either player. As 
people gain more knowledge and expertise 
about certain topics, they have more 
information to link with new, incoming 
information to create meaning. 
Fiske, Kinder, and Larter (1983) 
examined this idea by identifying participants 
as experts or novices according to their 
political expertise. Later participants read a 
description of a little-known third world 
country. The description contained an equal 
number of attributes consistent with a 
communist or democratic government. The 
participants were also told that the country 
was democratic, communist, or 
undifferentiated. The researchers found that 
novices focused on information about the 
country that was consistent with the form of 
government that they were made to believe 
the country had. Experts, however, focused 
on both the consistent and inconsistent 
information about the country.  The 
implication of this study is that experts have 
more complex knowledge structures and are 
able to process both consistent and 
inconsistent information. Novices, however, 
have less prior knowledge so they resort to 
using quick, superficial processing when 
making decisions.  
 Another important component for 
accurate decision-making involves how 
information is processed. According to Janis 
and Mann (1977), sound and rational 
decision-making occurs when the decision-
maker searches diligently for relevant 
information, assimilates this information in an 
unbiased manner, and evaluates alternatives 
carefully before making a choice. In order to 
search for relevant information, assimilate the 
information properly, and evaluate 
alternatives before making decisions, a person 
must have the motivation and enough time to 
do so (Anderson & Lindsay,1998).  
Motivation can be influenced by 
individual differences in need for cognition. 
Need for cognition is the need or desire to 
learn and understand (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982). Researchers studying the need for 
cognition gave participants an easy number 
circling task that involved circling all 1s, 5s, 
and 7s (the simple task) or a harder number 
circling task that involved circling all the 3s, 
any 6 that preceded a 7, and every other 4 (the 
more complex task). All participants showed 
frustration at the task; however, those with 
low need for cognition showed more 
frustration. Participants with high need for 
cognition enjoyed the more complex task 
more than the participants with low need for 
cognition. This indicates that people with 
higher need for cognition are more likely to 
enjoy more complex tasks than people with 
low need for cognition. People with high need 
for cognition, then, would be more likely to 
thoroughly assess information before making 
a decision than people with low need for 
cognition because a comprehensive 
assessment of available information is a 
complex task requiring time, effort, and 
cognitive resources. 
Need for closure also affects one’s 
motivation to process additional information. 
People with high need for closure lack the 
motivation to pursue additional information 
before making a decision. Their priority is not 
to make a good decision but to make a 
decision as soon as possible. Those with low 
need for closure take the time to explore 
alternative or added information. Webster and 
Kruglanski (1994), for example, presented 
participants with information about a job 
candidate. The participants were to form an 
impression of this candidate and judge the 
likelihood of his success on a job. Half of the 
participants read positive information before 
negative information, and the other half read 
negative information before positive 
information. Participants with high need for 
closure rated the job candidate more 
positively after hearing positive information 
first and more negatively after hearing 
negative information first. This indicates that 
the participants used the information that they 
read earlier in the sequence to make decisions 
rather than spend time understanding all of 
the information. These same participants 
requested fewer pages of information about 
the candidate, were more confident about 
their responses, and needed less time to make 
judgments. Those with high need for closure, 
thus, are more motivated to come to a quick 
decision rather than take the time to consider 
all available information. 
Time is also an important factor in the 
decision-making process. According to 
Kruglanski and Freund (1983), when people 
are pressed for time they use primacy effects. 
Primacy effects exist when people base 
inferences on early information and are 
affected less by later information. Teachers 
grading writing assignments, for example, 
were more likely to use stereotypes about the 
writer in their evaluations when under time 
pressure than when given time to consider 
carefully their ratings. Time pressure and the 
need to make a quick decision, therefore, 
intensify the tendency to refrain from 
critically probing for an adequate solution or 
decision (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).  
Lay knowledge, experiential 
knowledge, and naïve theories are ways that 
people gain social knowledge through 
experience and their environment. Naïve 
theories can be created from direct or indirect 
learning. Direct learning occurs when a 
person learns from his or her own 
experiences. Personal experience with 
someone from another race, for example, can 
create naïve theories about how people of that 
race behave. Indirect learning, however, 
occurs when a person learns vicariously from 
others. Naïve theories about people of other 
races may be created by watching the news or 
listening to others’ opinions about people of 
that race (Anderson & Lindsay, 1998). 
According to Gilovich (1985), first-
hand or direct information can be more 
accurate than secondhand information. In this 
study participants watched a video clip of a 
person instructed to describe a bad deed that 
he or she had committed in the past. 
Participants were to rate their impression of 
the person and then to retell the situation on a 
video-tape for another participant to watch. 
Participants who had watched the original 
video had less negative impressions of the 
person than the participants who watched the 
second video. The first participants took the 
situation and the person into account when 
forming their impressions. When retelling the 
situation, however, the first participants 
focused highly on the person’s characteristics 
and minimized the situation. Members of the 
second group were exposed to limited 
information, thus, forming more extreme 
impressions about the person than the first 
group. 
Although naïve theories can be 
formed or used incorrectly, people are still 
highly accurate when making decisions. 
Because people are able to gain social 
knowledge from everyday experience, 
researchers argue that the information being 
researched and taught within the field of 
psychology (the study of the mind and 
behavior) is commonsense or lay knowledge 
(Furnham, 1983). According to Gordon, 
Kleiman, and Hanie (1978), common sense is 
“A homespun awareness resulting from 
everyday experience, as opposed to the 
knowledge acquired from formal training in a 
technical philosophy.” (p. 894).  Formal 
training in psychology, therefore, may not 
provide students with much more knowledge 
about people than they already have from 
their own personal experience. 
 
 
 
Personal Experience 
To investigate this theory, researchers 
in personality, social, and developmental 
psychology tested whether people with little 
to no formal training are able to accurately 
predict research findings (Barnett, 1986, 
Barnett 1988, and Levenson & Ebling, 2003; 
Richard et. al., 2001). A true/false test was 
created for each study. Half of the questions 
on a test were true research findings from that 
field, the other half were foils (i.e., opposite 
statements or research outcomes that were not 
supported by research in the field). 
Participants were to indicate whether each 
statement on the test was true or false based 
on their current knowledge of the subject. 
Participants for each of these studies were 
mostly from introductory psychology courses 
with participants in the personality and 
developmental psychology studies ranging 
from high school students to undergraduate 
members of the Psi Chi psychology academic 
honor society. 
Researchers in all three areas 
(personality, social, and developmental 
psychology) found that participants were able 
to accurately predict research findings above 
50% or chance level. Participants in the 
personality study accurately identified an 
average of 76% of the research findings from 
the Personality Research Test (PRT). 
Participants in the social psychology study 
accurately identified an average of 68% of 
398 social psychological research findings 
established by research reviews. Participants 
in the developmental psychology study 
accurately identified an average of 76% of 
research findings on the Childhood and 
Adolescence Research Test (CART). Each 
result indicates that people with little to no 
formal training in personality, social, and 
developmental psychology can accurately 
(although not perfectly) predict the results of 
research by what the researchers deem is 
common sense. 
Researchers in educational 
psychology, industrial-organizational 
psychology, and marital relationships (Wong, 
1995; Gordon et.al., 1978; Levenson & 
Ebling, 2003) found that formal training in 
these areas did not contribute much if any 
knowledge to the field. The researchers 
studying educational psychology created five 
questionnaire forms using research findings 
from teaching and educational psychology. 
Each questionnaire was used to determine 
participants’ indication of perceived 
obviousness of research findings on teaching. 
The forms differed, however, because 
participants with Form A were to select which 
research finding they believed was accurate 
from two opposing findings, not to determine 
if a finding was true or false. They were also 
to indicate how obvious the finding was. 
Participants were not able to consistently 
distinguish actual findings from opposites. 
Thus, research in teaching is not as obvious as 
research in other fields of psychology. Further 
analysis also indicates that participants with 
more experience with teaching and 
educational psychology were not able to 
accurately predict the research findings any 
more often than less experienced and less 
trained participants.  
Gordon et al. (1978) used a similar 
questionnaire created from research results in 
industrial-organizational psychology. 
Students chose the correct research finding an 
average of 72% of the time. This result is over 
chance level (50%), indicating that research 
in I/O psychology is commonsense. Older 
participants and those with more managerial 
experience scored higher on the exam when 
formal training was held constant. This 
indicates that those with more experience 
know more of the research findings in I/O 
psychology than those who were formally 
trained in the field. 
Finally, Levenson and Ebling’s (2003) 
compared participants untrained in marriage 
(newlyweds, married, or divorced) to 
participants trained in marriage (marital 
researchers, clinical psychology graduate 
students, undergraduates, marital therapists, 
marital researchers, and pastoral counselors) 
on their ability to make accurate judgments 
about marital satisfaction. The results 
indicated that there was no overall difference 
between groups on accuracy. The more that 
understanding marriage had a high personal 
meaning to an individual, however, the more 
accurate that individual was in predicting 
marital satisfaction in couples.  
 
Formal Training 
Although these studies show that 
much of what is researched in personality, 
social, and developmental psychology is 
commonsense, the results in some studies 
indicate that formal training is still important 
(e.g., Barnett, 1986; Barnett, 1988). These 
studies compared the results of participants 
with differing levels of education. Results in 
both studies show that participants in general 
psychology courses were more accurate when 
predicting research findings than participants 
in high school. Participants in honors general 
psychology courses were more accurate than 
participants in the general psychology 
courses. Undergraduate members of general 
academic honor societies were more accurate 
than participants in the honors general 
psychology courses and so on. The results 
indicate that formal training in psychology 
does enhance a person’s knowledge of the 
subject. 
 
Current Study  
The purpose of the current study, 
therefore, is to use a measure of personal 
experience and a measure of formal training 
to determine which source of learning is a 
better indicator of the ability to accurately 
predict research findings in social 
psychology. Based on previous research, a 
larger correlation is expected between 
participant’s degree of personal experience 
and ability to accurately predict research 
findings in social psychology than between 
participant’s degree of formal training and 
ability to accurately predict research findings 
in social psychology. This hypothesis is based 
on the prior evidence that participants’ 
personal experience seems a better indicator 
than formal training on ability to accurately 
predict research findings. Although similar 
studies have addressed these two issues 
separately, no study to date has addressed 
these issues within the same sample of 
participants. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-three male and 164 female 
undergraduate students ages 18-62 from a 
midsized southern university participated in a 
study comparing the impact of personal 
experience and formal training on the ability 
to predict research findings in social 
psychology. Participants chose to participate 
in the study by signing an appointment sheet 
posted in the psychology department. 
Participants had a variety of studies to choose 
from, and instructors gave course credit for 
participating. A majority (69.2%) of the 
participants were Caucasian, 12.8% were 
African American, 5.7% were Hispanic, 4.0% 
were Asian/Pacific Islander, 3.1% were 
Middle Eastern, 1.8% were multiracial and 
3.5% were from other ethnic backgrounds.  
The researcher informed each 
participant that he or she had a right to 
discontinue the study at any time. Each 
participant was also informed that his or her 
responses were to remain anonymous. 
Participants signed a written consent form 
agreeing that they understood their rights and 
would participate. Participants were treated 
ethically throughout the study.  
 
Materials 
Materials included a questionnaire 
presenting research findings in social 
psychology, a personal experience (social 
engagement) questionnaire, a need for 
cognition scale, a need for closure scale, and a 
formal training questionnaire.  
The research findings questionnaire 
was created by Richard et al. (2001). It 
consisted of social psychological findings 
published in meta-analyses (quantitative 
research reviews). Statements were of the 
broadest conclusions reached in the meta-
analysis and were worded in everyday 
language. An example of a research finding 
from a meta-analysis reviewing 31 studies 
measuring the relationship between 
personality characteristics and persuasiveness 
reads: “Persuasive fear appeals induce 
behavior change.”  Another example of a 
research finding from a meta-analysis 
reviewing 13 studies measuring the 
relationship between rewards and productivity 
reads: “External rewards increase 
productivity.”  A stratified random sample of 
100 findings was collected from 398 meta-
analytic findings within 18 social 
psychological topics (e.g., Aggression, 
Attitudes, Social Influence, etc.), which 
served as the strata. A foil (or opposite 
finding) was created for each of these 
findings. The research finding that “women 
are more sensitive than men to facial cues,” 
for example, would read, “men are more 
sensitive than women to facial cues.”  About 
half of the statements in each set of findings 
on the questionnaire were research findings 
whereas the other half of the statements were 
foils of other research findings.  
Participants were instructed via 
computer that they were to read a series of 
statements. Some of the statements were 
research findings discovered by social 
psychologists whereas other statements were 
foils. Participants were to indicate on a 
computer (by pressing designated keys on a 
computer keyboard) whether each statement 
was or was not a social psychological 
research finding. The percentage of correctly 
identified research findings was computed as 
well as the percentage of correctly identified 
foils for each participant. This percentage was 
used to estimate each participant’s ability to 
accurately identify research findings in social 
psychology and served as a measure of 
knowledge about human social behavior.  
Personal experience was defined in 
terms of participants’ level of social 
engagement. Social engagement is how much 
time participants spend interacting with 
others. A social isolation scale and a social 
integration scale were used to determine each 
participant’s degree of social engagement. 
The social isolation scale was used to 
determine each participant’s lack of 
socialization (Dean, 1961). If people are 
isolated, they are not interacting with others. 
Therefore, the chances of them learning from 
their personal experiences through social 
interactions have been reduced. The social 
integration scale was used to determine how 
integrated the participants are into society. 
The more socially integrated participants are, 
the more socially active they are, and thus 
there is a better chance that the participants 
will have learned from these social 
interactions. 
The social isolation scale consisted of 
nine questions such as “Sometimes I feel all 
alone in the world” and “I don’t get invited 
out by friends as often as I’d really like” 
(Klemmack, Carlson, & Edwards, 1974). Five 
of the nine items were positive (e.g. “People 
are naturally friendly and helpful”) whereas 
four were negative (e.g., “Sometimes I feel all 
alone in the world”). The answer choices for 
each of the nine questions were indicated on a 
5-point Likert-type scale (with 1 suggesting 
the statement is Not at all true of me and 5 
suggesting the statement was Very much true 
of me). Each statement was presented via a 
computer, and the participants indicated their 
response to the items by pressing the 
corresponding keys on a computer keyboard. 
The researchers scored the Social 
Isolation scale by reverse scoring the 
appropriate items and summing the scores for 
each participant over all statements. The 
maximum possible score, thus, was 45 and 
the lowest possible score was 5. The higher 
the score a participant received, the more 
socially isolated the participant. Dean (1961) 
reported a Spearman-Brown split-half 
reliability of .84 for the Social Isolation scale. 
A test of validity indicated that social 
isolation is correlated with (yet independent 
of) Powerlessness and Normlessness, two 
components of alienation.  
The other component the researchers 
used to determine each participant’s degree of 
personal experience was the Social 
Integration Scale. According to Kunovich and 
Hodson (1999), Social Integration provides a 
buffer for social isolation and alienation. The 
social integration scale contains three parts:  
the presence of organizational memberships 
(e.g., political party, church organization, 
etc.), the frequency of social activities (e.g., 
going on a trip, attending social events, etc.), 
and maintaining close personal relationships 
(e.g., visiting friends, conversing with family 
members). The researchers used the seven 
question organizational membership portion, 
a modified version of the social activities 
scale, and the four item close personal 
relationships portion. 
Participants were informed via 
computer that they were to read a series of 
statements. For the first portion 
(organizational membership), participants 
were to answer yes or no to each question. A 
final score was created by a total percentage 
of yes answers. Participants were to answer 
the second portion of the statements 
(frequency of social activity) by indicating 
how often they participated in each activity 
(never, monthly, weekly). The three options 
are assigned 1-3 respectively. A final score 
for this portion was created by summing the 
number of never’s, monthly’s, and weekly’s 
chosen over all items. Higher scores indicate 
higher social integration. 
The final portion regarding close 
personal relationships contained questions in 
which the participant indicated how often he 
or she seeks interaction with friends and 
relatives (1 = never, 2 = monthly, 3 = weekly). 
A score was totaled for this portion by 
summing all of the items. Higher scores 
indicate higher social integration. The social 
activities scale has demonstrated adequate 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .76; 
Kunovich & Hodson, 1999). 
Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao’s (1984) 
measure of need for cognition was used to 
determine each participant’s motivation to 
exert cognitive effort. This scale consisted of 
eighteen items (e.g., “Thinking is not my idea 
of fun”). Participants were to indicate the 
degree of agreement or disagreement to each 
statement based on a -4 to +4 Likert-type 
scale. (+4  suggesting “very strong 
agreement” and -4 suggesting “very strong 
disagreement.)  Each statement was presented 
via a computer, and the participants indicated 
their response to the items by pressing the 
corresponding keys on a computer keyboard. 
The researchers scored the need for 
cognition scale by reverse scoring the 
appropriate items and summing the scores for 
each participant over all statements. The 
maximum possible score, therefore, was 72 
and the lowest possible score was -72. The 
higher the score a participant received, the 
higher the participant’s need for cognition. 
Cacioppo et al. (1984) reported a Spearman-
Brown split-half reliability of .87 for the need 
for cognition scale. A test of validity 
indicated that the need for cognition scale 
discriminated between groups known to differ 
in need for cognition; university faculty 
members and assembly line workers. Another 
test of validity indicated that need for 
cognition is correlated with (yet independent 
of) cognitive style. There is also no 
significant correlation between need for 
cognition and test anxiety.  
Webster and Kruglanski’s (1994) need 
for closure scale was used to determine each 
participant’s need to come to a decision. The 
scale consisted of forty-two items (e.g., “I 
don’t like situations that are uncertain.”). 
Subjects responded to these items on a 6-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Fifteen items 
are reverse scored. The total need for closure 
score is a sum of all items (after reverse 
scoring). Higher scores indicate higher need 
for closure. The need for closure scale has 
demonstrated high internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = .84) and high test-retest 
reliability (r = .86). 
A final ten question scale was created 
by the current researchers to determine each 
participant’s amount of formal training in 
psychology (e.g., “How many psychology 
courses have you completed in college so 
far?”). Three questions determined the status 
and field of study of the participants (e.g., 
“What is your current academic status?”). 
Three questions determined the number of 
classes each participant had taken in 
psychology (e.g., “How many Psychology 
courses did you complete in High School?”). 
Three more questions assessed the success the 
participants had in the courses and in school 
(e.g., “What is your overall GPA?”). A final 
question evaluated the number of psychology 
courses each participant was taking at the 
time of the study. 
The purpose of the formal training 
questionnaire was to measure the amount of 
formal education each participant had in 
psychology. The questionnaire also measured 
how well each participant completed the 
psychology classes already taken. Both are 
used as an indicator of formal knowledge 
received through classroom instruction. 
 
Procedure 
Each student was greeted by a male or 
female researcher and seated in a small 
computer classroom with no more than seven 
other participants. Each person was seated in 
front of a single computer. The researcher 
explained to the participants that the purpose 
of the study was to examine the influence 
personal experience and formal training have 
on people’s ability to predict research 
findings in social psychology. The researcher 
explained to the participants that they would 
be completing five surveys on the computer. 
The researcher explained the basic 
instructions on how to use the computer and 
how to respond to the surveys. The 
participants were also told by the researcher 
to remain seated until all surveys were 
completed by all participants. 
Students completed the research 
findings questionnaire first, then the personal 
experience questionnaire, the need for 
cognition questionnaire, and the need for 
closure questionnaire in random order. The 
final survey presented was the formal training 
questionnaire. Once all surveys were 
completed, the researcher answered any 
questions the participants had. The 
participants were then dismissed by the 
researcher. 
Results 
 The current study employed a quasi-
experimental design. Each participant 
completed a research findings questionnaire, 
four social engagement questionnaires, a 
series of formal training questions, a need for 
cognition questionnaire, and a need for 
closure questionnaire. Each participant’s 
answers were combined into a total score for 
each questionnaire whereas the answers for 
each of the formal training questions 
remained separate. The researchers first 
calculated the reliability and validity of each 
measure. The researchers then compared the 
results from the personal experience, need for 
closure, and need for cognition scales to the 
results from the research findings 
questionnaire. Results from each of the formal 
training questions were also compared to the 
results of the research findings questionnaire.  
There were a total of 227 participants, 
however, several datum were omitted from 
the study. The entire set of data from one 
participant was omitted because the person 
responded (T/F) to the statements in less than 
500 ms on 36% of trials. This pattern of data 
indicates that the person was most likely 
guessing because the person would have had 
insufficient time to read the statements. 
Another person indicated that he or she had 
taken twenty psychology classes in high 
school. This is very unlikely and it is probable 
that the student reported the number of credit 
hours taken instead of the number of classes. 
This information was considered invalid and 
was omitted from the analyses. Aside from 
these two restrictions, each analysis contained 
the maximum amount of data available. The 
Type I error rate was set to .05 for each 
comparison. 
 
Reliability and Validity of Measures. 
Participants’ responses to the social 
psychological findings questionnaire 
measured general knowledge of social 
behavior. Participants with high scores on this 
measure were able to accurately identify true 
research findings about human social 
behavior from foils related to human social 
behavior. Participants with high scores were 
also able to accurately identify false research 
findings. Participants judged 100 research 
findings (50 were true and 50 were false). A 
total score (with a maximum score of 1.0) was 
computed representing the proportion of 
findings correctly identified as true or false by 
the participant. A preliminary split-half 
reliability analysis of the measure estimated 
the reliability as relatively low (Spearman-
Brown Coefficient = .55).  
The researchers considered that 
several of the research findings used in the 
measure may be ambiguous to participants. 
According to Cohen (1992), research 
outcomes that have an effect size (a 
standardized mean difference, d) of .30 are 
“observable to the naked eye” (p.156). 
Therefore, associations of social behaviors 
supported by research that have effect 
magnitudes considerably less than .30 may be 
so subtle as to be observed only with 
difficulty by the average person. The 
true/false answers to these findings provided 
by the participants could be potential guesses. 
The researchers decided to eliminate the 
research findings that had a magnitude of less 
than .30 minus a .15 confidence interval. The 
.15 confidence interval represents the average 
variability of research outcomes in social 
psychology (see Richard, et al., 2003). The 
confidence interval was used to account for 
variations in the effect magnitude of studies 
that provided the reported magnitude for each 
finding. There was a positive but non-
significant relationship between the effect size 
magnitude and the accuracy with which 
participants correctly identified the findings 
as findings and the foils as foils [r (98) = .13, 
p = .21] suggesting that accuracy in judging 
findings may have been somewhat related, 
although not significantly related, to the 
magnitude of the effect being judged. As a 
result, 12 findings and their foils were 
eliminated from the questionnaire. Examples 
of these findings were:  “People are 
aggressive when they are hot” (Mr = .03), 
“Girls who are reared in father-absent homes 
are non-feminine” (Mr = .01), and 
“Subliminal advertising increases sales” (Mr = 
.001). A new split-half reliability analysis of 
the social psychological findings measure 
revealed that, without the ambiguous findings, 
the estimate of reliability was within an 
acceptable range, Spearman-Brown 
Coefficient = .65. 
The social engagement measures 
consisted of four separate questionnaires: 
social activity, close relationship, social 
isolation, and organizational membership. 
Participants’ responses to the social activity 
scale measured frequency of involvement in 
social events. Responses to the close 
relationship scale measured frequency of 
involvement in close relationships. Responses 
to the social isolation scale measured 
frequency of isolation from social activity. 
Responses to the organizational membership 
questionnaire measured involvement in 
organizations. A Cronbach’s α coefficient 
was calculated to determine the internal 
consistency of each measure.  The reliability 
estimates (Cronbach’s α) for the social 
activity measure, the close relationship scale, 
and the social isolation scale were .73, .68, 
and .53, respectively, with the social isolation 
scale demonstrating low reliability. The 
organization measure was excluded from the 
remaining analyses because estimates of 
internal consistency were considerably low, 
Cronbach’s α = .28. 
The three social engagement 
measures, the social activity scale, social 
isolation scale (which represents the opposite 
of social engagement), and close relationship 
scale, were all correlated with one another. 
The social activity scale was positively 
correlated with the close relationship scale, 
r(227) = .393, p < .0005, and negatively 
correlated with the social isolation scale, 
r(227) = -.230, p < .0005. The close 
relationship scale was negatively correlated 
with the social isolation scale, r(227) = -.203, 
p < .0005. These correlations indicate that 
each scale measured unique constructs that 
were conceptually related to each other. In 
this study, the construct represented by the 
relationship between each of the scales was 
defined as “social engagement.” 
The Need for Cognition scale 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) measured 
participants’ need to learn and understand 
information. The Cognitive Closure measure 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) was used to 
determine participants’ need to reach an 
answer, any answer, in order to avoid 
confusion or ambiguity. Cronbach’s α was 
used to determine the internal consistency of 
the measure. The reliability of need for 
cognition and cognitive closure measures 
were both estimated to be moderate, 
Cronbach’s α = .87; Cronbach’s α = .79. The 
two measures were negatively correlated, 
r(227) = -.257, p < .0005, indicating that the 
two measures are distinct yet conceptually 
related. 
 
Primary Analyses  
 
Formal training. Each participant’s 
scores on each measure of formal training 
were also compared to that participant’s 
accuracy in judging social psychological 
research findings. Several measures of formal 
training were used: academic status, major 
status, number of classes, class grades, and 
GPA.  
Academic status. It was hypothesized 
that participants’ accuracy rates would 
increase as their academic status increased. A 
one-way ANOVA compared each 
participant’s academic status to that 
participant’s ability to predict research 
findings. Participants’ accuracy in judging 
research findings increased as their academic 
status increased, F(5,220) = 4.51, p = .001. 
Post hoc tests revealed that graduate students 
were significantly more accurate than 
freshmen, sophomores, juniors, and seniors in 
judging social psychological research findings 
(see Figure 1).  
The accuracy rates of graduate 
students were not significantly different from 
post-baccalaureate students. There was also a 
significant linear trend, with accuracy in 
judging research findings increasing as a 
student’s academic status increases, F(1,196) 
= 17.83, p < .0005. This result was consistent 
with the hypothesis that accuracy rates would 
increase as academic status increases.  
 
Number of classes. It was 
hypothesized that participants’ accuracy in 
judging research findings would increase as 
the number of psychology classes participants 
completed increased. The number of 
psychology classes participants had in college 
was positively correlated with the ability to 
predict research outcomes, r(208) = .24, p = 
.001. The more psychology classes 
participants had in college, therefore, the 
more accurate they were when predicting 
research outcomes. This result supports the 
hypothesis that accuracy rates would increase 
as the number of psychology classes 
participants had in college increased.  
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Figure 1. Mean accuracy in judging social psychology research findings for students with 
varying academic backgrounds. 
 
It was hypothesized that participants’ ability 
to predict research findings in social 
psychology would also increase as the total 
number of classes that related to social 
psychology participants completed in college 
increased. The total number of classes each 
participant reported having that related to 
social psychology was positively correlated 
with the ability to predict research outcomes 
in social psychology, r(217) = .13, p = .05. 
The more classes dealing with social 
psychology a person had, the more accurately 
they predicted findings. This result supports 
the hypothesis that accuracy rates would 
increase as the total number of classes dealing 
with social psychology increased.  
 
Class grades. It was hypothesized that 
participants’ ability to predict research 
findings in social psychology would increase 
as participants’ class grades increased. A one-
way ANOVA compared participants’ grades 
in psychology classes and their ability to 
predict research findings. This initial analysis 
indicated that participants who were more 
accurate in judging research findings in social 
psychology had higher grades in psychology 
classes, F(3, 222) = 3.64, p = .01. 
Bonferroni’s post hoc test of multiple 
comparisons revealed that participants who 
received an A average grade in psychology 
classes were more accurate than participants 
who received a C average grade (p = .02).   A 
clear lack of a liner trend, however, did not 
support the hypothesis that accuracy would 
increase as grades in psychology classes 
increase, although some differences were 
observed (see Table 1 for means).  
It was hypothesized that participants’ 
accuracy rates would increase as their grades 
in classes related to social psychology 
increased. A one-way ANOVA was used to 
compare participants’ grades in classes 
relating to social psychology to their accuracy 
rates on the social psychological findings 
questionnaire. Participants who made higher 
grades in classes related to social psychology 
were not more accurate than participants who 
made lower grades in classes related to social 
psychology, F(3, 222) = .87, p = .46. This 
result does not support the hypothesis that 
accuracy rates would increase as grades in 
classes related to social psychology increase.  
 
Table 1  
 
Mean Accuracy Rates for Students Who 
Reported Average Grades in Psychology 
Classes 
 
Grade Mean Accuracy SD 
 
A .81 .07 
B .80 .06 
C .77 .06 
D   .86 .05 
 
Grade point average (GPA). It was 
hypothesized that participants’ accuracy rates 
would increase as their grade point average 
(GPA) increased. A one-way ANOVA was 
used to compare participants’ GPA to their 
ability to predict research findings. 
Participants’ accuracy in predicting research 
outcomes was not dependant on their GPA, 
F(4,221) = 1.84, p = .12. This result does not 
support the hypothesis that accuracy rates 
would increase as participants’ GPA 
increases.  
 
Major status. It was hypothesized that 
psychology majors would be more accurate 
than non-psychology majors on the ability to 
predict research findings. A one-way 
ANOVA was conducted to compare 
participants’ major status and their ability to 
predict research findings. Psychology majors 
were more accurate than non-psychology 
majors when judging research findings in 
social psychology, t(224) = -2.08, p =.04. 
This result supports the hypothesis that 
psychology majors would be more accurate 
when predicting research findings than non-
majors.  
 
Personal experience (social 
engagement). It was hypothesized that 
participants’ personal experience (defined as 
the degree of social engagement) would be a 
better predictor of accuracy than their formal 
training. Each participant’s scores on the 
social activity scale, close personal 
relationship scale, and social isolation scale 
were compared to the same participant’s 
accuracy in identifying true social 
psychological research findings as true and 
false social psychological research findings as 
false. The social activity scale, close personal 
relationship scale and social isolation scale 
were not significantly related to accuracy, 
r(224) = -.06, -.06, and .05, respectively, all 
ps ≥  .34. Contrary to the hypothesis, 
measures of social engagement did not predict 
accuracy in identifying research outcomes in 
social psychology. 
 
A  Comparison 
An interpretation of the primary 
analyses was that the amount of formal 
training a participant had received was a 
better predictor of accuracy in judging 
research outcomes than was the extent of that 
participant’s social engagement (or the 
amount of personal experience with human 
social behavior). The researchers determined 
that further analyses might provide a 
modification to this conclusion. The 
researchers determined that participants with 
minimal formal training (no more than one 
psychology class in college) were 
significantly more accurate than chance when 
identifying true and false research findings, 
t(54) =34.19, p <.0005. This was also true for 
students who indicated that they had taken no 
psychology classes (although they were 
currently enrolled in their first psychology 
class), t(27) =27.70, p <.0005. Students with 
minimal or no formal training in psychology, 
therefore, can accurately identify true from 
false statements about human social behavior.  
The researchers also determined that 
participants with high levels of formal 
training (graduate students and students who 
had completed at least ten psychology classes 
in college) were significantly more accurate 
when predicting research findings than 
participants with minimal or no formal 
training, t(59) = - 4.76, p <.0005. Overall, the 
difference in accuracy between participants 
with higher and lower levels of formal 
training, d = 1.91, was smaller than the 
difference in accuracy between participants 
with lower levels of formal training and 
guessing, d = 4.65. This indicates that the 
gains in participants’ accuracy attributable to 
formal training are small relative to what 
students had already accumulated before that 
formal training began. 
 
Secondary Analyses 
 
Need for cognition. The Need for 
Cognition Scale and Need for Closure Scales 
were used to determine the relationship 
between participants’ cognitive motivation 
and their accuracy in judging research 
findings. The Need for Cognition Scale 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) measured 
participants need to learn, understand, and 
spend time thinking about information. It was 
hypothesized that participants with high need 
for cognition would take more time when 
reading and answering the social 
psychological findings questionnaire and 
would therefore be more accurate when 
judging the research findings. Need for 
Cognition scores were correlated with 
accuracy rates in judging research findings. 
As participants’ need for cognition increased, 
their ability to accurately predict research 
findings also increased, r(226) = .15, p = .03.  
 
Need for closure. The Need for 
Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) 
measured participants need or motivation to 
come to a decision quickly rather than 
suspend judgment and think critically about 
the evidence. It was expected that participants 
high in need for closure would spend less 
time reading and answering the social 
psychological findings questionnaire and 
would therefore be less accurate when 
judging the research findings. Need for 
Closure scores were not highly correlated 
with accuracy rates in judging research 
findings. Participants’ need for closure did not 
affect their ability to accurately predict 
research findings, r(226) = .05, p = .50.  
 
Specific topics. The social 
psychological questionnaire was comprised of 
research findings that were grouped into 18 
broad topics within social psychology (e.g., 
aggression, health psychology, relationships, 
etc.) by Richard, et. al. (2001). Participants 
may know more about some of these topics 
than others from their experiences within 
certain topics. A prison guard working with 
dangerous criminals, for example, might 
know more about aggression than health 
psychology or helping behavior. It was 
expected, then, that participants’ accuracy in 
judging research findings would be higher for 
some topics than others. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA was conducted to compare each 
participant’s accuracy in judging research 
findings on 10 of the 18 different topics. Each 
of the 10 selected topics had a sufficient 
number of findings per participant (i.e., at 
least six findings) in order to compute a 
reliable mean. Table 2 lists the topics 
included in this analysis. Participants’ 
predicted research findings in some topics 
more accurately than in others, F(9, 1017) = 
10.64, p < .0005 (see Table 2 for means).  
In particular, participants were most 
accurate when predicting research findings 
about aggression (M = .81) and health 
psychology (M = .80). Participants were least 
accurate when predicting research findings 
about personality (M = .68) and attitudes (M = 
.67). Subsequent within-subjects contrast 
analyses revealed that participants’ accuracy 
rates for aggression and health psychology 
were significantly higher than their accuracy 
rates for the remaining eight topics, p < .05. 
Participants’ accuracy rates for predicting 
research findings in the topics of personality 
and attitudes were significantly lower than 
their accuracy rates for the remaining eight 
topics, p < .05. This finding supported the 
hypothesis that participants’ accuracy in 
judging research findings would be higher for 
some topics than others. 
The different topics in social psychology were 
also correlated with age, need for cognition, 
need for closure, the social activity scale, 
close personal relationship scale, social 
isolation scale, and the number of classes in 
college. There was a weak association 
between age and the topics of law and 
nonverbal behavior.  Participants who were 
older were better able to predict research 
findings within the topic of law, r(114) = .18, 
p = .05. Older participants were also better 
able to predict research findings within the 
topic of nonverbal behavior than younger 
participants, r(114) = -.18, p = .05. There was 
a weak association between need for 
cognition and the ability to predict research 
findings within the topic of relationships. As 
participants’ need for cognition increased, 
their ability to accurately predict research 
findings within the topic of relationships also 
increased, r(114) = .19, p = .05. Additionally, 
as participants completed more psychology 
classes in college, they were more accurate 
when predicting research findings within the 
topics of health, helping behavior, 
personality, and relationships, r(114) = .22, 
.21, .22, .30, respectively; all ps < .05.  
 
Table 2   
 
Mean Accuracy Rates for Findings from 
Social Psychological Topics 
 
Topic  Mean Accuracy SD 
 
Aggression .81 .16 
Health .80 .18 
Influence .75 .18 
Relationships .74 .18 
Helping Behavior .73 .15 
Nonverbal .72 .18 
Groups .72 .72 
Law .68 .68 
Personality .68 .14 
Attitudes .67 .15 
 
 
Discussion 
   
Many researchers believe that people 
can make accurate decisions and accurate 
predictions within social situations based on 
social knowledge gained from experiential 
learning, or lay knowledge (Kruglanski, 
1989). People use lay knowledge to create 
theories that are used to explain the causes of 
events and to make decisions (Anderson & 
Lindsay, 1998).  
Researchers in educational 
psychology, industrial-organizational 
psychology, and marital relationships (Wong, 
1995; Gordon et.al., 1978; Levenson & 
Ebling, 2003), for example, found that formal 
training in these areas did not contribute 
much, if any, knowledge to the fields. 
Participants with more knowledge of research 
in teaching and educational psychology, for 
example, were not able to accurately predict 
research findings any more often than less 
experienced and less trained participants.  
Researchers in personality, social, and 
developmental psychology (Barnett, 1986; 
Barnett 1988; Levenson & Ebling, 2003; 
Richard et. al., 2001), however, found that 
personal experience and formal training both 
contributed to knowledge within these fields. 
Participants with higher levels of formal 
training were more accurate than participants 
with lower levels of formal training, with all 
participants more accurate than chance 
responding. 
The researchers in personality, social, 
and developmental psychology concluded that 
the knowledge needed to be able to predict 
greater than 50 percent of the research 
findings is from everyday or personal 
experience. The researchers did not include a 
measure of personal experience to determine 
if and how this experience would correlate 
with the ability to predict research findings. 
The purpose of this study was to include a 
measure of personal experience (social 
engagement) to determine whether or not 
personal experience or formal training is a 
better predictor of social knowledge. The 
measures used were a social psychological 
questionnaire composed of consistently 
supported research findings in social 
psychology, a measure of formal training, and 
a personal experience measure that measured 
“social engagement.”  The social 
psychological questionnaire was intended to 
be a measure of social knowledge and the 
personal experience measure was intended to 
be a measure of participants’ social activity. 
The hypothesis was that personal 
experience would be a better predictor of 
social knowledge than formal training within 
this study because there was a large amount 
of evidence indicating that the knowledge of 
information within the fields of personality, 
social, developmental, educational, and 
industrial/organizational psychology, as well 
as studies of marital relationships, was from 
personal experience within these fields. 
Formal training, however, was still expected 
to be correlated with accuracy rates in the 
current study because higher levels of formal 
training were found to enhance knowledge in 
personality, social, and developmental 
psychology. The researchers expected 
personal experience to be correlated with 
accuracy rates regardless of level of formal 
training. 
We found, however, that a person’s level of 
personal experience or “social engagement” 
was not correlated with how accurately they 
were able to identify research findings in 
social psychology. Accuracy rates were better 
predicted by measures of that student’s formal 
training, such as their academic status and 
having taken an increased number of 
psychology classes dealing with social 
psychology. 
 
Formal Training  
The current study compared the 
accuracy rates of freshman, sophomore, 
junior, senior, post baccalaureate, and 
graduate students. In previous research, 
Barnett (1986; 1988) concluded that, although 
much of what is researched in personality, 
social, and developmental psychology is 
commonsense, formal training is still 
important. The studies conducted by Barnett 
compared the accuracy rates for high school, 
general psychology, honors general 
psychology, and general academic honor 
societies students. In each study, including the 
current study, as participants’ increased in 
academic status, their ability to predict 
research findings accurately also increased.  
An explanation for why participants 
are able to predict more research findings as 
their academic statuses increase is that as 
students increase in academic status, they are 
exposed to more information within their field 
of interest. Freshman and sophomore 
students, for example, usually take general 
education courses such as Biology and 
English. At the university where the current 
study was conducted, students must declare a 
major by their junior year. The junior and 
senior years are spent exposed to more 
knowledge about a specific field. This 
concentrated focus on psychology for juniors 
and seniors who are psychology majors 
presents students with more detailed 
information about psychology during these 
years. For students to enter and succeed in 
graduate school, they must have high grades. 
In order to obtain high grades, students must 
study and remember more discipline-specific 
information. As students increase in academic 
status, then, they are exposed to more 
information about psychology. This increased 
amount of information leads students to be 
more accurate when predicting research 
findings in social psychology. 
People often make decisions using 
naïve theories that were created from 
experiential learning. Although people are 
usually relatively accurate, they often create 
incorrect or biased theories about the social 
world. Like naïve theories, scientists conduct 
research to create generalizations about the 
world and specific events. Researchers, 
however, attempt to limit biased and incorrect 
information and to increase accuracy (Perrez, 
1991). This might explain why participants 
with higher levels of formal training in 
psychology were more accurate when 
predicting research findings in social 
psychology. Students taking psychology 
classes learn what researchers have found to 
be true about the world. As participants 
increased in academic status, became 
psychology majors, and took more 
psychology classes, they were presented 
information regarding their social world about 
which they might have had limited exposure 
to or about which they had formed an 
incorrect naïve theory. By exposing students 
to new information, psychology classes might 
challenge them to consider their own 
assumptions and generalizations and to 
correct any false theories they may have. 
In a study by Kowalski (2004), 
introductory psychology students were each 
given a true/false test that assessed 
psychological misconceptions. The test was 
administered at the beginning of the 
introductory psychology course and then 
again after 12 weeks. The researchers found 
that the students had significantly more 
questions correct on the true/false test when it 
was administered after 12 weeks (posttest) 
than they had at the beginning of the course. 
The implication of this finding is that students 
enter psychology classes with many 
misconceptions or false beliefs. Many of these 
beliefs, however, are corrected as the students 
are exposed to psychological information 
during the courses. The researchers also found 
that students who perform at higher levels 
(e.g., high grade point averages) and who 
think critically leave the introductory classes 
with fewer misconceptions. 
 
Personal Experience 
Although many of the aspects of the 
formal training measure were expected to be 
positively correlated with accuracy rates, the 
researchers believed that personal experience 
would be a better predictor of accuracy. To 
further support this assumption, the 
researchers found that the difference in 
accuracy between participants with higher and 
lower levels of formal training was smaller 
than the difference in accuracy between 
participants with lower levels of formal 
training and guessing. This indicates that 
much of participants’ gains in accuracy are 
due to previous knowledge and that formal 
training contributes a relatively modest 
amount to improving this accuracy. The 
measure of personal experience used in this 
study, however, did not correlate with the 
ability to correctly identify research findings 
in social psychology as expected. This 
indicates that the measure of personal 
experience used in this study, social 
engagement, is not a predictor of social 
knowledge.  
An explanation for this finding is that 
the “social engagement” measure might not 
be a good measure of how people acquire 
social knowledge. The researchers believed 
that people would learn the most social 
information by interacting with others. This 
social interaction would allow for an 
exchange of information between people that 
would be considered “lay knowledge.”  
People may use other methods besides social 
interaction, however, to obtain social 
knowledge.  
According to Bandura (1977), people 
can gain social knowledge from watching 
other people. This is called observational or 
vicarious learning. People with limited social 
activity or interactions might still have a great 
bit of social knowledge gained from studying 
others’ actions. While sitting in a park 
reading, doing work at an office, or eating 
lunch alone, people might still be aware of 
what is going on around them. They are still 
able to make note of others’ actions and 
formulate naïve theories about the social 
world.  
People may also learn vicariously 
from watching television or playing video 
games. According to Lachlan, Smith, and 
Tamborini (2005), for example, video game 
players are highly likely to learn aggression 
from violent video games when the characters 
in the games are seen as highly attractive and 
similar to the self. This result was considered 
in the frame of the social cognitive theory 
which states that people imitate characters 
that they find attractive. The participants in 
the current study may have gained equal or 
more social information from relating to 
characters in video games, on television, and 
in other media sources than from actual social 
interactions. Participants may have used this 
information to complete the social 
psychological questionnaire. 
  Other researchers have studied the 
effects of mass media on adolescent identity 
formation. Adolescents specifically learn a 
great deal about gender roles from the media. 
Both girls and boys use forms of media such 
as television for gender knowledge while girls 
in particular use magazines to learn about 
males and relationships. Adolescents use this 
knowledge to create sexual and romantic 
scripts that may be used immediately or 
stored for later use in relationships (Arnett, 
1995). A possible gender script that people 
could learn from the media is that boys are 
more aggressive than girls. If participants 
with little direct experience with aggressive 
males or non-aggressive females learned this 
script from the media, they might be more 
likely to answer true to a question on the 
social psychological research finding 
questionnaire that states, “Men are more 
aggressive than women.”  
Vicarious learning, then, is an 
additional option for learning social 
information separate from social engagement. 
It is also possible that vicarious learning and 
social engagement can occur simultaneously 
or interact. What is learned vicariously, for 
example, can be acted out during social 
interactions or stored for later use. Often 
behaviors that are acted out are regulated by 
others within the person’s social realm 
(Arnett, 1995). If the behaviors are 
inappropriate and the person is reprimanded, 
the behaviors may not continue. If the person 
is not reprimanded for inappropriate 
behaviors or if the behaviors are actually 
appropriate, then the chances of the behaviors 
continuing are greater. A person’s social 
network, then, can be an important factor in 
determining what to believe is appropriate 
from media sources. If a person does not have 
an attentive social network to help regulate 
behaviors or if the person stores the 
information learned from media sources 
without acting it out, what they think is true 
about the social world may be construed from 
the rest of society (Arnett). These 
misconceptions might lead to inaccuracy on 
the social psychological questionnaire. 
Another explanation for why there the 
social engagement measure was not related to 
accuracy rates is that people sometimes only 
need a small portion of information about 
others to make judgments. In a study by 
Ambady and Rosenthal (1993), for example, 
teachers were rated on several personality 
characteristics by people that they have 
known for a while (principals and students) 
and by complete strangers. The strangers’ 
ratings were highly accurate predictors of the 
ratings made by the people that had many 
interactions with the teachers. Participants 
were also no more accurate when they 
watched 30 seconds of video clips than when 
they watched 6 seconds of video clips. 
People, then, may gain just as much social 
knowledge from small amounts of experience 
as it is possible to gain from larger amounts of 
experience.  
  It would be difficult, then, to 
determine exactly how and in what situations 
people learn certain social information. A 
person may have learned that “men are more 
aggressive than women” from watching 
others, playing video games, or watching 
television. They may have learned the 
information from someone telling them that 
“men are more aggressive than women”. They 
may also have learned the information from 
the classroom. Social learning may occur 
from several different sources with no one 
particular source being the most important. 
Another explanation for the lack of 
relationship between the personal experience 
measure and the social psychological findings 
questionnaire might be related to the setting in 
which the participants were tested. According 
to Tulving and Thomson (1973), the retrieval 
of a piece of information from memory 
depends on the presence of retrieval cues that 
match with some aspect of the stored piece of 
information. Recalling a word from a list of 
words, for example, might be easier if the 
person is presented with another word from 
the same list. One type of retrieval cue is the 
context that information is learned in. Godden 
and Baddeley (1975), for example, found that 
people are better able to remember 
information when they are in the same context 
that they were in when the information was 
learned. In particular, Godden and Baddeley 
found that divers recalled more words from a 
word list learned underwater when they were 
underwater than when they were on land. 
Participants who learned the word list on land 
recalled more words when on land than in 
water.  
Applying context-dependent memory 
to the current study, participants were to make 
judgments about social research outcomes in 
a laboratory at an academic institution. It may 
be that this academic setting was a cue that 
led participants to recall the information that 
they had learned in a similar academic setting 
as opposed to during social activities. 
Participants were also presented with 
statements and asked to respond true or false. 
Responding to such statements is a task 
similar to test taking methods presented in the 
classroom. This also might have contributed 
to the access of information learned in a 
similar setting.  
When asked about their participation 
in social activities, it may have been more 
difficult for participants to recall how often 
they participated in these activities while 
sitting in an academic setting. It might have 
been much easier, however, to recall 
information for the formal training 
questionnaire because participants were in a 
formal training atmosphere. The experimental 
setting may have been more similar to a 
university classroom than a typical social 
setting. 
In order to determine the context 
effects of this study, future studies might 
present the research findings in a more social 
context. Participants could watch skits 
portraying a true or false research finding 
with the intention of answering whether or not 
the scenario presented in the skit is true or 
false for most situations (e.g., a clip showing 
a man being aggressive or a clip showing a 
woman being aggressive). This social context 
idea is similar to a measure called the 
Interpersonal Perception Task (IPT) that is 
used to evaluate participants’ sensitivity to 
nonverbal and verbal cues (Costanzo & 
Archer, 1989 as cited in Ambady, Hallahan, 
& Rosenthal, 1995). This measure is 
specifically used to determine how well 
people can predict others’ personality 
attributes from verbal and nonverbal 
behavior. The IPT measure consists of 30, 60-
90 second videotaped scenes of naturalistic 
behavior (e.g., kinship, lies, competition, 
status, and intimacy) with each scene 
followed by a question regarding the scene 
that has an objectively correct answer. 
Participants in future studies could be 
presented with a measure similar to the IPT 
or, instead of videotaped scenes, the social 
psychological findings could be presented in 
written scenarios. 
 
Social Knowledge Specificity 
 Another explanation for the lack of an 
observed relationship between social 
engagement and social knowledge is that the 
social engagement measure and the social 
psychological questionnaire may be too 
broad. The research findings on the 
questionnaire were taken from 18 different 
social topics. The social engagement measure 
was a general measure of social engagement. 
In reality, participants may know more about 
certain social topics than others. For example, 
a person working as a security guard at a 
prison may know more about aggression than 
someone working behind a desk at a quiet 
office. This increased knowledge about a 
topic might lead participants to be more 
accurate when predicting research findings 
about that specific topic. In support of this 
idea, several researchers have found that 
participants with greater knowledge about a 
topic are better able to recall information 
related to that topic and are better able to 
process information about that topic (Chase & 
Simon, 1973; Fiske, Kinder, & Larter, 1983).  
The researchers found that, as a 
whole, participants did know more about 
certain topics than others. Particularly, 
participants knew the most about aggression 
and health, both important topics for human 
survival. When correlated with formal 
training and social engagement, it was 
determined that participants who had 
completed more psychology classes in college 
were more accurate when predicting research 
findings on health, helping behavior, 
personality, and relationships. This indicates 
that out of the ten social psychological topics, 
participants were the most accurate when 
answering true or false questions about health, 
helping behavior, personality, and 
relationships from their psychology classes.  
To explain this finding, participants 
may have taken more psychology classes that 
dealt with health, helping behavior, 
personality, and relationships (e.g., Theories 
of Personality, Social Psychology,  Stress 
Management etc.) and less psychology classes 
that dealt with other topics like experimental 
methods (e.g., Psychological Testing, 
Foundations of Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, etc.). At the university in which this 
study was conducted, participants seeking a 
degree in Psychology are required to take at 
least five foundation courses which include 
the choices of Theories of Personality and 
Social Psychology. Students are also required 
to take at least three elective courses which 
include the choice of taking Stress 
Management. Further analyses would be 
required to find out exactly which classes deal 
with the topics of health, helping behavior, 
personality, and relationships, the percentage 
of students that took these classes, and 
whether or not these students are more 
accurate when predicting research findings in 
health, helping behavior, personality, and 
relationships than students with no exposure 
to the topics. 
 Participants’ level of social 
engagement did not influence their accuracy 
when predicting research findings within 
specific social psychological topics. The 
social engagement measure was a broad 
measure of social activity whereas each topic 
on the psychological findings questionnaire 
was a specific measure of knowledge about 
that topic. Future studies should use a 
personal experience measure that relates 
directly to a specific topic. For example, the 
research findings and the personal experience 
measure could focus solely on aggression. 
This would better determine if participants 
with experience within a certain topic of 
social psychology (e.g., aggressive social 
behavior) are more accurate when predicting 
research findings within that same topic (e.g., 
aggression) than participants with less 
experience. 
 It is possible, too, that the social 
psychological questionnaire is not a good 
measure of “social knowledge.”  Scientific 
research is an attempt to eliminate biases. The 
research findings used in the social 
psychological questionnaire were consistently 
supported findings from meta-analytic studies 
in the field. The social psychological 
questionnaire, then, is a collection of unbiased 
truths about social knowledge. Because 
people do not create perfect theories about the 
social world, it is expected that they would 
have some biases in their assumptions about 
human social behavior. Participants would not 
score exceptionally high on a true/false test 
comprised of unbiased statements unless they 
have been exposed to the unbiased research 
findings taught in the classroom. This might 
explain why participants with higher levels of 
formal training in psychology were more 
accurate when predicting the social 
psychological research findings. 
A more accurate measure of “social 
knowledge” could be created by collecting 
consistently supported ideas about the social 
world created by people, not science. The 
ideas included in the new measure of social 
knowledge would include both correct and 
incorrect assumptions about the world. These 
ideas would be a more accurate reflection of 
what people truly believe about the social 
world rather than what people believe about 
scientific research outcomes. 
 
Conclusion  
 The purpose of this study was to 
determine whether formal training or personal 
experience is a better predictor of the ability 
to correctly identify research findings in 
social psychology. In this study, (and similar 
to others) participants correctly identified 
greater than 50 percent of the research 
findings presented to them as true or false 
regardless of their level of formal training. 
This indicates that people know psychological 
information without it being taught to them in 
a classroom. The personal experience 
measure of social engagement was intended 
to be a measure one’s level of personal 
experience with human social behavior. 
Participants’ levels of social engagement, 
however, were not correlated with their 
ability to accurately predict research findings. 
As participants’ levels of formal 
training increased, however, they were more 
accurate when predicting the social 
psychological research findings.  In 
particular, as participants completed more 
psychology classes in college, they were more 
accurate when predicting research findings 
within the topics of health, helping behavior, 
personality, and relationships. 
It was also determined that the 
difference in accuracy between participants 
with lower levels of formal training and 
guessing was larger than the difference in 
accuracy between participants with higher 
and lower levels of formal training. This 
indicates that formal training contributes very 
little to increased accuracy and that most of 
participants’ accuracy comes from previous 
knowledge. It was concluded, then, that 
although participants’ amount of social 
engagement did not predict accuracy, people 
still learn social knowledge through some 
non-academic form, perhaps by personal or 
vicarious experience. 
Like previous studies, this study 
indicates that people know quite a bit of 
psychological information regardless of 
formal training. In particular, this study 
indicates that social engagement is not 
necessarily how this information is learned. 
More research would need to be conducted 
using different measures of personal 
experience to accurately test the role of 
personal experience in the development of lay 
theories. 
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